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1.  Introduction1 
 
In 2008, the collapse of the market for 
securitized subprime mortgages in the United 
States triggered a financial crisis that spread 
rapidly around the world. Although Canada’s 
financial institutions were not directly 
threatened as in other countries, the extent of 
continental economic integration meant that 
the crisis weakened the Canadian economy and 
profoundly affected the lives of many working 
Canadians. At the time of this writing, it is 
unclear when recovery will begin or how 
robust it will be. It is also unclear what longer-
term effects the crisis will have on employment, 
the distribution of income, and the extent of 
poverty in Canada. We do know that every 
recent recession has brought with it a widening 
of income disparities and that the long term 
consequences of a growth in poverty and 
economic insecurity are felt for decades:  in 
individual lives, on social development, and on 
economic performance.  
 
In times of crisis, a preoccupation with the 
short-term future is understandable. Since 
responses to the crisis will have to address and 
build on (or dismantle, but at least deal with) 
the economic legacy of the recent past, it is 
especially useful to look back on the experience 
of the past few decades, and to ask who won 
and who lost from the impressive economic 
performance of the past decade. Before the 
crisis, the economy had been growing at a 
strong pace since 1997, representing the most 
sustained period of expansion since the 1960s. 
Interest rates and inflation were at their lowest  
                                            
1 Research for this chapter was partially supported by 
Canadian Institutes of Health Research Interdisciplinary 
Capacity Enhancement team grant no. 80070 
(Globalization and the Health of Canadians).   
 
 
levels in half a century;  officially measured 
unemployment in 2008 was at its lowest level in 
35 years; and the federal government had run 
11 consecutive budget surpluses (albeit, as 
noted in section 3, at a considerable cost in 
terms of social policy). By 2007 all provinces 
and territories as well as the federal 
government were running surpluses, an 
achievement that was 60 years in the making 
(Courchene, 2008).   
 
This chapter describes how the economic gains 
of that period were distributed among 
Canadian families2 raising children under 18 
over the course of a generation (between 1976 
and 2006). Families with children are not, of 
course, the only Canadians who matter.  
However, almost half of Canadians live in such 
families, and everything we know about the 
importance of childhood and adolescence 
indicates that the environment for children – 
the opportunities they have or don’t have to 
survive and thrive, to grow up healthy and 
secure – matters powerfully for the future 
society that all of us will inhabit. The chapter is 
based on custom tabulations  from Statistics 
Canada Survey of Labour and Income 
Dynamics,  a sample of all such families divided 
into ten groups of equal size, from the 10% of 
households with the lowest incomes (the 
bottom decile) to the 10% with the highest 
incomes (the top decile).   
                                            
2  A family, as defined for purposes of this chapter, 
consists of a household with at least one adult and at 
least one person under the age of 18. Thus, a single 
mother raising a child and a two-earner couple with 
several children are both “families” for purposes of this 
definition. Older children may be present, but there must 
be at least one adult and one child under the age of 18 to 
be part of the sample described here.  
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It is easier to understand these abstract 
concepts if we attach numbers to them. For 
example, in 2006 the top decile of families 
raising children had earned incomes (that is, 
incomes generated from wages, salaries, 
commissions and self-employment) of more 
than $140,000; the median earned  income  of  
families  in that decile was  $173,600. (In other 
words, families with incomes higher than that 
figure constituted the top 5% of families in the 
income distribution.)  After accounting for 
transfers and taxes, the lower limit of the top 
decile fell to $118,900, and the median to 
$141,500. On the other hand, the bottom 
decile of families had earned incomes that did 
not exceed $10,400, but the median earned 
annual income for this group was just $860 
(Figure 1).3 In other words, a substantial 
                                            
3 This is the median earned income of all families raising 
children in the bottom decile, including those with no 
earned incomes and those with negative incomes (the 
number of families in this bottom decile had no 
earned income at all. After taxes and transfers, 
however, the median income of the poorest 
decile rose to $20,100 (Figure 2). So Canada’s 
social safety nets make an important difference, 
although as we will see they are fraying.  
 
There are at least two important stories here, 
as well as a number of unanswered questions. 
Part 2 of the chapter tells the first story, about 
inequality in earned incomes: that is, changes in 
the way families raising children earn their 
living. Part 3 tells the second story, about what 
the tax and transfer system did, and did not do, 
to offset the trend of rising inequality in market 
                                                                       
negative incomes having been converted to zero). 
Negative earned incomes can occur for those who are 
self-employed, who accounted for 15.5% of the employed 
labour force in 2008. 
Figure 1: Where Do You Belong? Distribution of After-Tax Incomes 
Among Families Raising Children Under 18, Canada, 2006
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incomes. Part 4 poses some hard questions 
about the future – questions that are made 
more urgent by the current recession and the 
apparent lack of public support for social and 
economic policies that would support all 
Canadian families raising children.   
 
2.  Growing inequality in earned incomes: 
the shift to the top 
 
Despite the fact that the value of Canada’s 
economic product more than doubled between  
1976 and 2006 in real (i.e. inflation-adjusted) 
terms, families with children in the bottom half 
of the distribution of earned incomes were 
doing no better in real terms at the end of that 
generation-long period than at the beginning.  
The bottom four deciles were doing 
substantially worse. The drop in the earned 
incomes of people in the bottom decile was 
especially precipitous – more than 70% over 
the course of a generation (Figure 3, on the 
following page).  Conversely, the earnings of 
families in the top two deciles of the income 
distribution, and in particular the top decile, 
have increased substantially. In constant 2006 
dollars, the median earned income of a family in 
the top decile was roughly $127,000 at the end 
of the 1970s, but had risen to over $169,000 in 
the opening years of the century (2003-2006) 
(Figure 4).  
  
Figure 2: Where Do You Belong? Distribution of Earned Incomes Among 
Families Raising Children Under 18, Canada
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Figure 3: Changing Fortunes:  Percent Change in Median Earnings, 
comparing 1976‐1979 to 2003‐2006, Families Raising Children, Canada
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Figure 4: Richest 10% are breaking away from the pack: Median Earnings (in 
constant $2006) of Families Raising Children Under 18, Canada, 1976 ‐ 2006
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Figure 5: The shares of earnings are becoming more concentrated at the top: 
Comparing  distribution of earnings among Canadian Families with Children 
in the late 1970s with today
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This shift can also be described in terms of the 
different share of all earned income flowing to 
each decile. Between 1976-79 and 2003-06,4 
the share of income earned by the bottom 30% 
of families with children decreased from 10.4% 
to 7.0%, while the top decile’s share increased 
from 23.2% to 29.1% (Figure 5). Stated yet 
another way, in 2006 average earnings of 
families in the top decile were 75 times as high 
as those of families in the poorest decile, 
compared to 32 times in 1976. The work of 
other researchers, using tax filer data rather 
than the sources used here, indicates that a 
substantial portion of this trend reflects a sharp 
increase in the share of income going to the 
very top of the income distribution. The 
income share of the top 1% of families grew 
                                            
4  Four-year averages have been used to avoid the 
inference that single-year dates have been ‘cherry-picked’ 
to skew the results. 
from just over 5% in 1982 to 10% in 2000 (Saez 
& Veall, 2005; Saez, 2005), and the share of 
income flowing to the top 0.1% (the top one-
thousandth) of individuals grew from about 2% 
at the end of the 1970s to more than 5% by 
2002 (Saez, 2005).  
 
The trend to increasing inequality is driven by 
rates of pay (wages, salaries, and income from 
self-employment); it is not explained by a 
change in the number of hours worked. The 
same Statistics Canada data set shows that 
earners in households with children were, on 
average, working 185 more hours in 2006 than 
in 1996. This is not true of the richest decile, 
which showed essentially no variation in their 
annual hours of work over the decade. Data on 
hours worked are only available for 1996 and 
after, but data on weeks worked are available 
from 1976, and they show a similar pattern. In 
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every decile except the top one (Figure 6), the 
earners who support families were working 
more, but for most deciles this was not 
reflected in a commensurate increase in 
incomes. To the extent that the number of 
weeks worked reflects an increase in the 
proportion of families with two working adults, 
one inference is that for many Canadian 
families, having two earners served not as a way 
of getting ahead, but only as a way of not falling 
further behind. Indeed, although in the late 
1970s most families raising children already had 
more than one worker in the labour market, 
only the top two deciles normally had two full-
year workers. Today, about half of Canadian 
families depend on two full-year workers, and 
families in the bottom half of the income 
distribution are catching up rapidly to the top 
half in terms of the total number of weeks 
worked by a household member. Yet the 
figures show that this is not translating into any 
reduction in economic inequality, although they 
clearly suggest that families with only one 
earner, unless he or she is close to the top of 
the income distribution, can expect an 
increasingly bleak future.  
    
Because this work was funded in part by a 
research project focused on the situations of 
low-income families with children in Canada’s 
three largest metropolitan areas (Toronto, 
Montréal and Vancouver), we looked separately 
at the income distribution patterns in the three 
corresponding provinces, whose economies are 
dominated by these three large cities (Figure 7).
   
Figure 6: All Households Are Working More ‐ Except the Top 10% Average 
Weeks Worked, by Decile, Families Raising Children Under 18, Canada, 
1976‐2004
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Ontario has the nation’s widest dispersion in 
earned incomes, with median earned incomes 
for the top decile of families  increasing from 
just under $123,000 at the start of the 
recessionary 1980s to just under  $188,000 in 
2006 (in constant 2006 dollars), while the 
bottom 40% of families were earning less  than 
a generation earlier. In B.C., what is especially 
noticeable is a strong loss in earning capacity 
for the bottom 70% of the income distribution. 
In fact, the median earnings of B.C. families with 
children declined by 12% between 1976 and 
2006. In Quebec, the bottom 50% of families 
raising children were earning less by the early 
2000s than in the late 1970s, but the declines at 
the very bottom of the income spectrum were 
not as precipitous as in many other 
jurisdictions. This is because incomes for the 
poorest families with children were lower in 
Quebec than in any other jurisdiction with the 
exception of New Brunswick in the late 1970s.    
What accounts for the general pattern of 
increased inequality of earned incomes? 
Although a detailed discussion would take us 
far beyond the scope of this chapter, a few 
possible contributors can be identified.   
 
One, perhaps the most familiar in the 
economics literature, involves the rising returns 
to ‘skill’ – an ill-defined variable for which 
formal education is often used as a proxy – and 
the collapse in demand for “unskilled” labour 
throughout high-income countries (Nickell & 
Bell, 1995). Statistics Canada figures show that 
people with no more than a high school 
education experienced dramatic declines in 
their median earnings during the period 1980-
2000, as compared with the experience of 
those with university degrees. However, during 
the period 2000-2005 strong growth meant 
that even the ‘unskilled’ experienced modest 
earnings gains (Chung, 2006). Nonetheless,  
Figure 7: Change in Earned Incomes, Comparing Families Raising Children in  
late 1970s to those in early 2000s, in Quebec, Ontario and B.C.
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between 1997-98 and 2006-07, “average 
earnings of managers grew a solid 20%, four 
times the rate for other employees,” 
accounting for at least one-third of the earnings 
growth among the highest-paid five% of private 
sector employees. Only a small part of this 
growth was accounted for by the rising 
percentage of managers with university degrees 
(Morissette, 2008). So education, while 
obviously important in explaining earnings 
inequality, is only part of the picture.  
 
A second factor, particularly relevant to the 
bottom of the income distribution, is a decline 
in minimum wage rates and other elements of 
the wage ‘floor’.  Between 1976 and 2005, the 
real value of the minimum wage in B.C. and 
Québec dropped by 21%; in Ontario, it 
dropped by almost 17% (Murray & Mackenzie, 
2007). Relatedly, as we show in section 3, 
systems of income support such as jobless 
benefits and social assistance were stripped 
back. The combination of a declining real 
minimum wage and the reduced availability and 
value of income support had direct effects on 
after-tax income, but also exerted downward 
pressure on the reserve wage:  the price at 
which a worker is compelled to provide his or 
her labour. As noted in the discussion of 
education, a third factor is the rapid growth in 
rates of pay for  those at the top of the income 
spectrum – compensation that has little relation 
to the productivity and/or profitability of the 
firm in question (Mackenzie, 2009).   
 
It is plausible, in turn, to view these trends as 
reflecting the combined effects of privatization, 
economic deregulation and continental 
economic integration underpinned by the 
Canada-US Free Trade Agreement – all 
elements of the neoliberal economic agenda 
pursued by the Conservative government that 
came to power in 1984. Explaining 
interprovincial differences in earned income 
trends is more complicated. Growth in 
dispersion in Ontario after the mid-1990s might 
have something to do with the policies of a 
Conservative provincial government that 
actively pursued closer integration with the US 
economy, including legalizing the 60-hour work 
week (a measure that was repealed when a 
new government took office), as part of a 
“North American region-state” (Courchene, 
2001). The bottom of the wage spectrum saw 
downward pressure, as in all jurisdictions, and 
there was a marked increase in the prevalence 
of temporary and casual work without the 
protection of relevant or enforced employment 
standards. At the other end of the spectrum, 
Ontario is home to the financial capital of 
Canada, a sector in which executive 
compensation has exploded in the past decade, 
here as elsewhere, as economic growth has 
increasingly become driven by financial gains 
rather than increases in production. Such gains 
in executive compensation set the tone for 
accelerating increases in the price of high-level 
management in unrelated industrial sectors, 
viewed as the cost of competing to attract 
‘talent’ where needed.  
 
Whatever the explanations, the data provided 
here refute the claim that GDP growth 
necessarily leads to widely shared increases in 
prosperity. Instead, over the course of a 
generation during which the value of Canada’s 
economic product more than doubled, the 
earned incomes of families with children in the 
bottom half of the income spectrum declined. 
 
3.  Government makes a difference: the 
retreat from redistribution 
 
Government makes a difference in income 
distribution both directly and indirectly. The 
public sector is a major source of employment 
in most high-income countries, and the wages, 
salaries and benefits it provides its workers 
establishes a model for compensation. 
Governments also determine the rules for 
private sector payment, and the levels of 
income below which citizens can expect not to 
be permitted to fall. The ‘floor’ is established 
through the standards government sets through 
minimum wages and other elements of labour 
law, and by redistributing income using taxes 
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and transfers. In Canada, as noted earlier, the 
effect of transfers is particularly important in 
increasing the incomes of those at the bottom 
of the economic scale. 
 
However, Canada’s social safety nets have not 
prevented increases in economic inequality. As 
shown in Figure 8, the gap between the average 
incomes after taxes and transfers of the top and 
bottom deciles of families raising children, after 
remaining relatively stable for two decades, 
started a rapid climb in the mid-1990s. This 
trend can be attributed to the combined effects 
of several changes in social policy. For example, 
between 1990 and 1996, Canada’s 
unemployment insurance system had been 
‘reformed’ four times, reducing eligibility, 
duration of benefits and income replacement 
levels. During the recession of 1990-91, 83 per 
cent of the unemployed received jobless 
benefits. By early 2009, as the most severe 
global economic crisis seen since the 1930s 
engulfed world economies, only 43% of 
Canada’s unemployed were in receipt of jobless 
benefits. Not since the early 1940s had 
Canadians been so exposed to economic risk, 
and this occurred by design (Yalnizyan, 2009). 
Meanwhile, reductions in eligibility for jobless 
benefits meant that between 1995 and 2007 the 
Canadian government took in $54 billion more 
in EI premiums from workers and employers 
than it paid out in benefits (Canadian Institute 
of Actuaries, 2007), making this payroll tax a 
major contributor to successive federal budget 
surpluses.  Further, termination of the Canada 
Assistance Plan in 1995 marked “the end of at 
least a forty-year commitment by the federal 
government to play a direct and specific role in 
funding social assistance in association with the 
provinces” (Rice & Prince, 2000, p. 125). 
Contemporaneously, income tax cuts nationally 
and in at least two provinces (B.C. and 
Ontario) disproportionately benefited high 
earners (Lee, 2007). 
 
The cumulative effect of these and other policy 
changes was described in a recent Statistics 
Canada report: “Redistribution grew enough in 
the 1980s to offset 130% of the growth in 
family market-income inequality -- more than
Figure 8: After‐Tax Rich/Poor Income Gap Soared Over Past Two Decades, in 
good times and bad
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Figure 9: Government Transfers, Not Tax Cuts, Made the Biggest Difference 
Most Families Raising Children in Canada Percent Change to Median 
Incomes, by Decile, Comparing 1976‐79 to 2003‐2006
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Figure 10: Top 10% only ones who increased share of after‐tax income 
Percentage Change in Shares of Incomes between the Periods of 1976‐79 
and 2003‐06 for Families Raising Children, by Decile, Canada
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enough to keep after-tax income inequality 
stable. However, in the 1990-to-2004 period, 
redistribution did not grow at the same pace as 
market-income inequality and offset only 19% 
of the increase in family market-income 
inequality” (Heisz, 2007). This is entirely 
consistent with the broader pattern of neo-
liberalization described by Wahl and by 
Goodman in their chapters in the volume.  
 
Although there is no evidence of cause and 
effect, the social and tax policies pursued by the 
federal Liberal government post-1993 are 
remarkably congruent with the advice provided 
by the International Monetary Fund’s Mission to 
Canada in 1994 and 1995 (Halifax Initiative, 
1999),5 and are best viewed as complementing 
and intensifying the market-oriented policies, in 
particular continental economic integration, 
initiated pre-1993.    
 
Figures 9 and 10, on the preceding page, tell the 
story in different ways. Figure 9 shows that 
government transfers more than compensated 
for the precipitous declines in the earned 
incomes of families in the bottom decile   over 
the course of a generation, but barely kept the 
rest of the bottom half from falling behind.  And 
Figure 10 shows that the top 10% of families 
were the only group that increased its share of 
income after taxes and transfers in any 
meaningful way over the past generation. 
                                            
5  The IMF Mission’s recommendations to Minister of 
Finance Martin were released to the Halifax Initiative in 
1999, in response to an Access to Information Act 
request.  
Figure 11: Change in After‐Tax Incomes, Comparing Families Raising Children 
in late 1970s to those in early 2000s, in Québec, Ontario and B.C.
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Striking interprovincial differences exist in the 
redistributive effect of taxes and transfers 
(Figure 11, on the preceding page). In Québec, 
transfers resulted in a large increase in median 
after-tax incomes for the bottom decile over 
the past generation, and a significant increase 
for the second decile, although almost no 
increase for families in the third decile. In B.C., 
by contrast, transfers did not prevent the 
bottom six deciles (60%) of families with 
children from losing ground economically, 
primarily as a result of reduced earning 
capacity; only the top 20% were significantly 
better off than a generation earlier. The 
Ontario picture shows that the poorest decile 
saw some improvements over the course of a 
generation (a 9% increase but in dollar terms, 
only about $1,500 more, or $130 a month). But 
the second and third deciles both lost ground. 
In contrast, the top three deciles saw important 
increases in their after-tax incomes, increases 
of at least $20,000 a year, in inflation-adjusted 
terms, from one generation to the next. 
 
Improvements for families in the bottom decile 
of the distribution throughout the country  
were primarily driven by the introduction and 
enhancement of the federal Canada Child Tax 
Benefit in the early 1990s, which converted a 
universal family allowance to an income-
targeted support.  Child-targeted supports have 
been the only significant federal policy initiative 
for improving income redistribution since the 
early 1990s.   
 
It is important to emphasize that governments’ 
retreat from redistribution is not confined to 
direct income transfers. The retreat has also 
been evident in the reduced provision of 
various kinds of in-kind services: the reduced 
scope of provincial health insurance coverage 
and the withdrawal of the national (and some 
Figure 12: The Impact of Taxes and Transfers on Child Poverty
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provincial) governments from the housing 
policy field, adding to the problems of housing 
affordability experienced by lower-income 
families (Shapcott, 2009),  are two examples 
with particular significance for families lower in 
the income distribution. Therefore, the 
description provided here almost certainly 
understates the extent to which the social 
protection functions of the Canadian state have 
been curtailed or privatized, in favour of a 
norm that at least implicitly regards a higher 
level of inequality as acceptable and shifts risk 
to the individual or the family (Fudge & 
Cossman, 2002). Tax reforms over the past 
decade could have been used to close the gap, 
as was the case in several European nations. 
However the net effect of tax reform in Canada 
was to do the opposite: provide most of the 
benefit of tax cuts to those already most 
affluent. A study comparing changes in tax 
policy across the OECD’s 30 member 
countries between 2000 and 2006 concluded:  
“Across the OECD, tax-burden changes have 
tended to favour low-wage earners. But in a 
significant minority of countries, tax reforms 
have mainly benefited higher-income groups” 
(Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, 2008, p. 39). Canada, like the 
United States and Australia, was among this 
minority.    
 
The lesson that government can make a 
difference is clear from other international 
comparisons. Figure 12 shows child poverty 
rates before and after taxes and transfers in the 
late 1990s, using a standard measure of poverty 
(family income <50% of national median, 
adjusted for family size), for selected high-
income countries. On the basis of market 
income, almost 23% of Canadian children, 
almost 28% of French children, and 18% of 
Swedish children would have lived in poverty.  
However, France used social spending to 
reduce this figure to 7.5%, and Sweden to 4.2% 
– a far more impressive performance than 
Canada’s.   
 
4. The future of inequality, and what it 
means for families 
 
We have described a picture in which (a) the 
market has not benefited many Canadian 
families over the past generation, and (b) 
governments have gradually retreated from the 
responsibility for mitigating the effects of 
differences in earned income through social 
provision. It is too early to assess how the 
impacts of the severe recession that began in 
2008 will be distributed, but if past patterns 
hold it is likely to result in a further increase in 
economic inequality, at least over the short 
term. Governments could have made creative 
use of deficit-financed fiscal stimuli to reduce 
both these impacts and the longer-term trend 
toward growing inequality, including both 
sharply increased direct transfers to low-
income families and equity-oriented priorities 
for infrastructure investment, emphasizing such 
uses as affordable housing and public 
transportation. At time of this writing (June, 
2009), little evidence can be seen either of this 
approach or of an effort to increase the 
progressivity of taxation (the extent to which 
higher-income and families pay a greater 
proportion of their incomes in taxes, reflecting 
their greater ability to pay).   
 
Over the longer term, several issues are of 
concern. Increases in economic inequality at 
the national and provincial level have been 
accompanied by increases in the concentrations 
of high and low income in Canadian cities 
(Caryl Arundel and Associates, 2003; Ross, 
Houle, & Aye, 2004; Hulchanski, 2007). In the 
Toronto Census Metropolitan Area (CMA), 
2001 census data showed that “the rising 
income gap between high and low-income 
families was mirrored by a rising gap between 
high and low-income neighbourhoods. In 
Toronto, median family before-tax income in 
the poorest 10% of neighbourhoods rose 0.2% 
from 1980. In the richest 10%, it was up 23.3% 
… This increasing difference was observed in all 
larger CMAs. This steady rise in the income of 
high-income neighbourhoods suggests a 
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widening gap between the rich and poor that is 
not only seen in income polarization but also in 
terms of spatial polarization” (Heisz, 2006, p. 
11). If a continued increase in inequality at the 
provincial level is reflected or magnified 
through spatial segregation at the metropolitan 
level, the effect on the social sustainability of 
our cities (Polèse & Stren, eds., 2000) and their 
desirability as places to raise families, for all but 
the wealthiest, will be highly destructive. 
 
Further, simple arithmetic tells us that unless 
economic recovery is exceptionally robust, 
governments that are now going deeply into 
deficit (for good reason) may experience a debt 
hangover for the next decade. Today deficit 
spending is all the rage, but tomorrow the need 
to reduce those deficits and pay off the 
accumulated debt could be invoked to justify a 
further retreat from social provision, as even 
today’s safety nets are declared unaffordable in 
a context in which shifting the burden of 
taxation to higher income families appears a 
forbidden topic. It is commonplace in 2009 to 
hear that the economic crisis has led to a 
reconsideration of the neoliberal, market-
oriented policies of the 1980s. It is also 
possible, however, if recession leads to further 
increases in inequality the response will involve 
not a strengthening of safety nets but rather a 
new cycle of withdrawal from social provision, 
as recovery’s winners see little reason to pay 
taxes to improve the situation of those left 
behind. Already in 2006 Canadian health 
economist Robert Evans, citing rapid recent 
increases in economic inequality, wondered:  “If 
we are back to a pre-war income distribution, 
how much of our post-war social policies can 
survive?” (Evans, 2006). 
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